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Abstract
This study analyzes a two-sided search model in which agents are vertically hetero-
geneous and agents on one side do not know their own type. Agents with imperfect
self-knowledge update their beliefs based on the o¤ers or rejections they receive from
others. The results are as follows. An agent with imperfect self-knowledge lowers his
or her reservation level if the agent receives a rejection that leads him or her to revise
belief downward. However, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise his or
her reservation level even if the agent receives an o¤er that leads him or her to revise
his or her belief upward. As a result, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge has the
highest reservation level when he or she has just entered the market; after that, a series
of meetings gradually lowers his or her reservation level over the duration of the search.
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1 Introduction
Many studies have examined individual search behavior with incomplete information (e.g.,
Rothschild (1974), Morgan (1985), Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), Bikhechandani and
Sharma (1996), and Adam (2001)). However, while most authors have focused on the un-
certainty about the shape of the wage distribution, the present study focuses on agents
uncertainty about their own type. More specically, we introduce learning about ones own
type into a two-sided search model and examine the interaction between the marriage pat-
tern (i.e., who marries whom) and learning at market equilibrium. In this regard, this study
makes a contribution to the literature on search, since few previous studies of this topic have
paid attention to imperfect self-knowledge.
In Gonzalez and Shi (2010), agents learn about their own job-nding abilities through
o¤ers or rejections from rms. In contrast to that studys directed search model, ours is a
random two-sided search model in which searchers do not know their own type but do know
the types of others. Thus, they update their beliefs about their own type after observing
o¤ers or rejections from others. For example, when searching for a job, workers are evaluated
by prospective employers on their types (abilities or skills) when they meet. If a worker
is inexperienced, the workers self-assessment is based on limited experience. By contrast,
employers may have considerable experience evaluating workers. As a result, a young worker
may learn something about his or her own worker type when he or she observes an o¤er or
a rejection from an employer.1
Similarly, in the context of the marriage market, a single agent is evaluated with re-
gard to his or her marital charm by an agent of the opposite sex. When agents are young,
their self-assessment is based on limited experience, perhaps including height, age, academic
achievement, or family background. However, because marital charm is determined by vari-
ous elements such as attraction, intelligence, height, age, education, income, position at work,
social status, and family background, an agent of the opposite sex may be in a better position
to assess a young agents charm than the agent himself/herself.2
From a methodological perspective, we introduce learning about ones own type by using
the framework of Burdett and Coles (1997), which is a two-sided search model with continuous
types of agents under complete information. Although our model focuses on marriage, the
ideas and techniques can be applied to other two-sided search frameworks, such as the labor
market, the housing market, and other markets where heterogeneous buyers and sellers search
for the right partner. In addition, we assume non-transferable utility : it is impossible for a
pair to bargain for the division of total utility. In the labor market, utility is generally
assumed to be transferable. However, for example, when a worker has great interest in a job
because of its location or when an employer is attracted to the worker on account of his or
1 If experienced workers search for a new job that is similar to their previous job, they may have a more
accurate self-assessment of their ability than their potential employers. However, such situations are not
considered in this study.
2Although marital charm comprises various elements, for simplicity, most studies assume it is one-
dimensional and scalar. Therefore, we adopt the same approach here.
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her personality, these utilities can be considered non-transferable. Moreover, wages might be
restricted, for example by a legislated minimum wage or an industry-wide union relationship.
When wages and all other terms of the relationship are xed beforehand, and the pair cannot
negotiate after they meet, their utility can be considered non-transferable (see Burdett and
Wright (1998)).
The model is described as follows, using the marriage market as a context. Single men
or women are vertically heterogeneous; that is, there exists a ranking of marital charm (or
types). Single agents enter the market to search for a marital partner. The (inherent) type of
the opposite sex can be recognized when a man and a woman meet. However, while all men
know their types, women who have just entered the marriage market do not.3 In addition,
each agents optimal search strategy is reservation level,which depends on the agents time
cost and beliefs in the market. An agent continues searching until meeting an agent of the
opposite sex who is at least as good as his or her predetermined reservation level. A man
and woman marry and leave the market if they meet and both propose. If at least one of
the two decides to reject, they separate and continue to search for another partner. From
these settings, the marriage pattern in the market is determined: agents of either sex are
partitioned into clusters of marriages when sorting, in a kind of positive assortative matching
(PAM).4
The results presented in this paper show that because of the belief-updating process, a
woman may reject a man who she would accept if she had perfect self-knowledge or accept
a man who she would reject if she had perfect self-knowledge. As a result, marriages of all
women with imperfect self-knowledge, except the highest-type women, are delayed by their
own learning. Moreover, the existence of women with imperfect self-knowledge in the market
lowers the reservation level of all men, except the highest-type men, because womens learning
delays the marriages of these men.
This study also shows that a series of meetings gradually reduces the reservation level
of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge over the duration of the search. A woman with
imperfect self-knowledge lowers her reservation level when she receives a rejection that conveys
some information about her type. By contrast, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge never
raises her reservation level even if she receives an o¤er from a man. This is because a higher
o¤er results in a woman with imperfect self-knowledge getting married, as in Burdett and
Vishwanath (1988). Moreover, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise her
reservation level even if she receives an o¤er that leads her to revise her belief upward. The
decision of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge whether to accept a man depends on her
decision after learning. Hence, a man who will be rejected by her after her learning is also
rejected by her before. Therefore, even if she updates her belief upward, her reservation level
3 If all women know their own types and male entrants initially do not, qualitatively, the results remain the
same. The one-sided imperfect knowledge assumption makes it easier to determine the inuence of imperfect
self-knowledge than when neither party has perfect knowledge.
4PAM is said to hold if the characteristics (i.e., types and marital charm) of those who match are positively
correlated. Becker (1973) nds strong empirical evidence of a positive correlation between the characteristics
of partners.
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does not rise. From these results, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge has the highest
reservation level when she has just entered the market.
The possible sources of declining reservation wages have received much attention in the
search literature (see Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). In particular, the sequence of the
reservation wage, which completely describes the behavior of agents when search is a se-
quential process, declines with the duration of the search (see Gronau (1971), Salop (1973),
Sant (1977), and Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). The inuence of search duration on the
reservation wage is not yet well understood empirically.5 Several empirical studies show that
declining reservation wages are monotonic only when certain conditions on the variables hold
in the model (Kiefer and Neumann (1981), Lancaster (1985), Addison, Centeno, and Portu-
gal (2004), and Brown and Taylor (2009)). Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) also show that
when workers learn an unknown wage distribution, the reservation wage of an unemployed
worker declines with his or her unemployment spell in a search model. In their model, the
worker is employed when he or she receives a high o¤er. By contrast, the worker perceives
the jobs available to him or her as o¤ering low wages when he receives an o¤er much lower
than expected. Then, the worker revises his or her reservation wage downward. Unlike their
model, our model is a two-sided search model and agents know the distribution of types but
do not know their own type. In two-sided search models, receiving an o¤er is likely to lead to
an increase in the reservation level of an agent with imperfect self-knowledge; however, our
results show that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge does not revise his or her reservation
level upward when he or she receives an o¤er.
There are few studies on imperfect self-knowledge in the search literature. Gonzalez and
Shi (2010) show that learning from search can lead the desired wages (the wage in the chosen
submarket) and reservation wages to decline with the unemployment duration in the directed
search model with two types of agents. In their model, the value function of an unemployed
worker strictly increases in the workers belief about his or her own ability, because a worker
or a rm chooses the submarket to search. Hence, the reservation wage strictly decreases
over the search duration, as the workers belief becomes gradually worse. In contrast to their
model, ours is a random two-sided search model with one-sided imperfect self-knowledge.
Agents are of n types, and an agent with imperfect self-knowledge decides the reservation
utility based on the distribution of beliefs in the market and his or her learning process in the
future. Thus, the value function in our model is not monotonic with respect to the agents
belief.
Maruyama (2010) investigate the case of three types of agents under a one-sided imperfect
self-knowledge assumption. It is di¢ cult for the present study to investigate the possibility of
multiple equilibria and to show the inuence of agents with imperfect self-knowledge on the
behavior of others in the market because of n ( 2) types of agents. By contrast, Maruyama
(2010) demonstrates that inuence and shows that multiple equilibria arise.
Furthermore, Maruyama (2013) investigate the case of two types of agents under two-
5Generally, it is ambiguous as to whether declining reservation wages are monotonic. Furthermore, mea-
suring the e¤ect of search duration on reservation wage is di¢ cult.
4
sided imperfect self-knowledge (i.e., where both men and women do not know their own type
when they have just entered the marriage market). In the two-sided imperfect self-knowledge
framework, the reservation level of an agent is simultaneously a¤ected by two factors: (i)
the share of agents of the opposite sex who currently reject his or her type due to imperfect
self-knowledge and (ii) his ore her uncertainty of his or her own type. By contrast, these
two factors separately a¤ect the reservation level of an agent in the one-sided imperfect
self-knowledge framework.
The present study and Maruyama (2010) adopts the cloning assumption; if a couple
marries and leaves the market, two identical types of agents enter the market immediately.
By contrast, Maruyama (2013) assumes exogenous inow, which may be more reasonable
than the cloning assumption but complicates the analysis (see Burdett and Coles (1999)).
For this reason, Maruyama (2013) examine the case of two types of agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic frame-
work for our analysis. In Section 3, we assume that agents are rational, except that all agents
expect that the type distributions of each sex in the market and the distribution of agents
beliefs are constant through time. Under these settings, we characterize a search equilibrium,
for any given inow distributions of each sex. Moreover, we rst derive a perfect sorting
equilibrium (PSE) as a benchmark case, in which only persons of the same type marry under
perfect self-knowledge. In Section 3.2, we introduce the concept of imperfect self-knowledge.
In Section 3.3, we investigate the properties of the reservation utility level of an agent with
imperfect self-knowledge. In Section 3.4, we characterize PSE with imperfect self-knowledge.
At search equilibrium, one can calculate the number and type distribution of agents who
exit the market through marriage in each period. If outow distribution and number who
exit are equal to inow distribution and the number who enter the market, respectively, the
distributions in the market become constant. Then, the steady-state equilibrium is derived,
as discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Basic framework
This section presents the basic framework for our analysis. Let us assume that a large, equal
number of single men and women, N , participate in the marriage market. Each single agent
in the market wants to marry an agent of the opposite sex.
Finding a marital partner always entails a time cost. Contacting an agent of the opposite
sex is di¢ cult. Let  denotes the rate at which a single agent contacts an agent of the
opposite sex, where  is the parameter of the Poisson process.6
Let us assume that agents are ex ante heterogeneous. Let x denotes the type (charm) of
a single man or woman in the market; it is assumed to be a real number.
6Here,  =M (N;N) =N =M (1; 1). That is, the encounter function leads to the constant returns to scale.
When all agents are homogeneous, all encounters result in a match; at this time, the encounter function means
the matching function. However, because agents in this study are heterogeneous, encounters do not always
result in a match.
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When a man and a woman meet, each agent can instantly know the opponents (innate)
type and decide whether or not to propose. For simplicity, let us assume that both agents
simultaneously submit o¤ers or rejections. If at least one of the two agents decides to reject,
they separate and each search for another partner. If both agents propose, they marry and
exit the marriage market permanently.
All agents discount at rate r > 0, and an agent is assumed to obtain zero utility ow while
he or she is single, whereas if he or she marries, he or she obtains a utility ow equal to his
or her spouses type per unit of time, and vice versa. That is, utilities are non-transferable:
agents cannot bargain for the division of the total marital utility. Furthermore, we assume
that people live permanently and that there is no divorce.
Let dt denotes the number of new single men and women who enter the market in any
time interval dt. Let 	i (:) ; i = m;w; denote the type distribution of male (m) or female
entrants (w). For simplicity, we assume that 	i (:) strictly increase over the interval [x¯ i
; xi],
where x
¯ i
and xi indicate the inmum and supremum of its support, respectively, and x¯ i
> 0,
for i = m;w.
Let Fm (:; t) denotes the type distribution of men in the market in period t. Similarly,
Fw (:; t) denotes the type distribution of women at t.
For simplicity, let us assume that there are n discrete types of men and women, di¤er-
entiated by level of charm. Let xk=r denotes the (discounted) utility of marrying a k-type
agent (k = 1; 2; : : : ; n). Let us assume that x1 > x2 > : : : > xn > 0. That is, all agents
want to marry a 1-type agent. Let ik, for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n, denotes the share of k-type agents
i (= m;w) in the market, where
Pn
k=1 
i
k = 1.
3 Stationary environment
To investigate the inuence of imperfect self-knowledge on the behavior of all agents, we rst
explore the stationary environment. In Section 4, we explore the steady sate.
In this section, we assume that all agents believe that the market can be characterized by
a stationary type distribution of men and women (Fm; Fw), where Fi (x; t) = Fi (x) ; for all x
and all t, and for i = m;w: Let us assume that Fi has support [x¯ i
; xi]; for i = m;w.
We rst derive a search equilibrium with perfect self-knowledge, which is a benchmark, in
the next section.7 Later, we study a search equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge (i.e.,
where agents do not perfectly know their own types) and compare the equilibrium with the
benchmark case.
3.1 Perfect self-knowledge Benchmark result
Given (Fm; Fw), we can dene the following search equilibrium with perfect self-knowledge.
Denition 1 Under perfect self-knowledge (that is, where all agents know their own types),
7Here, we consider the basic framework of Burdett and Coles (1997).
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given the stationary distribution Fi (:), for i = m;w, a search equilibrium with perfect self-
knowledge requires that all agents maximize their expected discounted utilities.
In a search equilibrium, it is not necessarily true that the inow of agents into the mar-
ket equals the outow of agents. In Section 4, we identify (Fm; Fw) ; where the two ow
distributions are equal.
Moreover, to show the inuence of learning on the behavior of all agents, we restrict
our attention to the following equilibrium, which we use under perfect self-knowledge as a
benchmark.
Denition 2 In a perfect sorting equilibrium (PSE), only persons of the same type marry.
We rst derive a search PSE. Given (Fm; Fw), all agents use stationary strategies, which
specify which agents of the opposite sex an agent will propose to if they meet. Hence, the
set of agents of the opposite sex who will propose to an agent of type x is well dened.
Let "m (x) denotes the share of men who propose to a woman with x, if they meet, and
let Fm (:jx) denotes the type distribution of these men. Hence, w (x) = "m (x) is the
rate at which a woman with x receives o¤ers. In a similar fashion, we dene Fw (:jx) and
m (x) = "w (x) for all x:
Let Vw (xk) denotes a k-type womans expected discounted lifetime utility when single.
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply that
Vw (xk) =
1
1+rdt

w (xk) dtE

max

xk
r ; Vw (xk)
	 jxk+ (1  w (xk) dt)Vw (xk)
where xk has the distribution Fm (:jxk). Manipulating this equation and letting dt! 0 yields
rVw (xk) = w (xk)E

max

xk
r ; Vw (xk)
	  Vw (xk) jxk : (1)
The strategy takes the form of a reservation match strategy a k-type woman will accept
a man on contact if and only if his type is at least as great as Rw (xk)  rVw (xk).
Since the situation is the same for men, the expected discounted lifetime utility of a single
k-type man, Vm (xk), satises
rVm (xk) = m (xk)E

max

xk
r ; Vm (xk)
	  Vm (xk) jxk : (2)
where xk has Fw (:jxk). From (2), we can obtain the reservation match strategy of a k-type
man Rm (xk)  rVm (xk).
For search equilibrium, w (xk) and Fm (:jxk) must be consistent with the reservation
match strategy of men, described by (2). The same is true for men.
In the equilibrium, all agents use a reservation rule. If a man will propose to a woman
with type x0, he will also propose to a woman with type x00 > x0.
As an agent with x00 receives at least the same o¤ers as an agent with x0, Vi (x00)  Vi (x0),
i = m;w: Hence, in the equilibrium, the reservation strategies Ri (:) are nondecreasing, for
i = m;w.
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The next proposition shows that in a PSE, a k-type man, for k = 1; : : : ; n, only proposes
to women with the same type or higher, and rejects women with a lower type. Women do the
same. Consequently, k-type agents who marry within their group form a cluster of marriages
(cluster k) in a search PSE.
Proposition 1 Let us assume that all agents recognize their own types. There exists a PSE
if (a) xk+1 < Rm (xk)  
w
k xk
wk +r
 xk, for k = 1; : : : ; n   1 and Rm (xn)  
w
nxn
wn+r
 xn, and
(b) xk+1 < Rw (xk)  
m
k xk
mk +r
 xk for k = 1; : : : ; n  1; and Rw (xn)  
m
n xn
mn +r
 xn.8
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that with constant , an k-type agent rejects k + 1-type opposite
sex agents if the share of k-type agents of the opposite sex is su¢ ciently large or if the
di¤erence between xk and xk+1 is su¢ ciently large that they satisfy xk+1 < Ri (xk), for
i; j = m;w. Conversely, a k-type agent accepts a k + 1-type opposite sex agent if there
are su¢ ciently few k-type opposite sex agents, or if (xk   xk+1) is su¢ ciently small that
xk+1  Ri (xk). If Ri (xk)  xn; k = 1; : : : ; n, all agents obtain the same expected discounted
utility: Vi (x1) = : : : = Vi (xn)  xnr , i = m;w.
If r = 0, xk+1 < Ri (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n   1, and i = m;w. Therefore, the equilibrium
is the PSE when r = 0.
To clarify the inuence of learning on a market, in the following sections, we assume that
(Fm; Fw) and xk are common across equilibria and that the conditions in Proposition 1 are
satised: xk  Ri (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n, and i = m;w.9 This restriction and the assumption
of n discrete types simplify the analysis. In Burdett and Coles (1997), where agentstypes
are continuous, agents of either sex are partitioned into n classes when sorting, which is
a kind of PAM, under perfect self-knowledge. Even if agentstypes are discrete, men and
women can be partitioned into some classes based on the reservation levels of opposite sex
agents, similar to Burdett and Coles (1997). The restriction Ri (xk)  xk ensures that the
equilibrium under perfect self-knowledge leads to PAM instead of classes, as in Burdett and
Coles (1997). In other words, type equals classwhen agentstypes are discrete under
perfect self-knowledge. Thus, the reservation level of k-type agents determines the k-th type
of agents of the opposite sex.
In the model with learning, more partitions are generated than those under perfect self-
knowledge.
3.2 Imperfect self-knowledge
Let us assume that all men know their (innate) types, whereas no women know their types
when they have just entered the marriage market.10 Then, a woman with imperfect self-
8At this time, the boundary conditions are Rm (x1)  
w
1 x1
w1 +r
< x1, Rw (x1)  
m
1 x1
m1 +r
< x1, Rm (xn) 
mn xn
mn +r
 xn, and Rw (xn)  
m
n xn
mn +r
 xn.
9For the other parameter ranges, it is di¢ cult to show the indirect e¤ect (indirect externality) of the
learning process.
10 If all women know their own type and no men initially know their type, the results are essentially the
same.
8
knowledge (i.e., one who does not perfectly know her own type) will have a belief about her
own type.
At the start of period t = 0; 1; : : : ; t, a j-type woman with imperfect self-knowledge meets
a man randomly, j = 1; : : : ; n. Both sexes can instantly recognize the innate type of an
agent of the opposite sex when they meet.11 For simplicity, we assume that a man need not
know the belief (or history) of a woman he meets.12 They simultaneously submit their o¤ers
or rejections.13 If they separate, the woman updates her belief about her own type, and
therefore, also revises her reservation level. Then, she searches for another partner.
Let otm (xj) 2 O = fo; o g denotes the action of a man observed by a j-type woman as
a result of a search outcome in period t. Here, O is the action set. If the j-type woman
observes search outcome
 
xtk; o

, she knows that the k-type man accepted her. If the j-type
woman observes
 
xtk; o
 , she knows that the k-type man rejected her.14
Let assume that [xb; xa] for a < b is a set of types a woman believes she may belong to
before observing
 
xtk; o
t
m (xj)

at t. Let a;b 2 ([xb; xa]) denotes this womans belief about
her own type, where ([xb; xa]) is a set of probability distributions over [xb; xa]. The prior
belief is 0 2 ([x¯w; xw]). Moreover, 0 is assumed to be the type distribution of new female
entrants, 	w (:), which is common knowledge.15 Therefore, 0 is the same distribution for all
women. Moreover, let a;b (xj) denotes the probability that a woman with belief a;b assigns
herself to a particular type xj 2 [xb; xa]. This probability is determined by using Bayesrule
given 0.
Since mens strategies have the reservation-level property, a proposal or rejection from a
man provides a woman with information indicating that she does not belong to a particular
set of types of women. If a woman with a;b observes (xk; o), this o¤er informs her that her
type does not belong to [x
¯w
; Rm (xk)). Let xd(k) denotes an inmum type of women to whom
a k-type man proposes, that is, Rm (xk)  xd. Therefore, she updates her belief to a;d(k). If
xd(k)  xb, in contrast, her belief remains a;b. The case of xd(k) > xa is ruled out, because
all agents are rational in this paper.
By contrast, if the woman observes (xk; o ), she know that her type does not belong
to [xd(k); xw]. Hence, she changes her belief to d(k)+1;b for xa  xd(k)+1  xb. If xa < xd(k)+1,
in contrast, her belief remains a;b. The case of xb > xd(k)+1 is also ruled out because all agents
are rational. Generally, the womans posterior belief, a0;b0 (xj), after observing
 
xk; o
t
m (xj)

11A woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not know whether she is accepted by a man she meets before
observing his action because of her imperfect self-knowledge. However, she can instantly recognize his actual
type.
12 In other words, we assume that a man does not regard the history of a woman whom he meets as a bad
or good signal because men know that all women learn about their own types through meetings. If a man
rejected a woman because of her long search duration, her learning would be delayed.
13 If a man can instantly recognize the belief of a woman when they meet, he can know her action (i.e.,
whether she will propose) before observing it. Thus, results similar to those of our study can also be obtained
in the case of a sequential move, in which a woman proposes to a man in the rst move and he proposes or
rejects her in the next move.
14Note that, in the model with discrete types, when an agent lowers his or her own reservation strategy, this
does not always mean that he or she accepts an agent of the opposite sex he or she has previously rejected.
15 In Gonzalez and Shi (2010), the initial expectation of the ability of a new worker depends on the distrib-
ution of the levels of ability of new workers.
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in a period is given by16
a0;b0 (xj) =
a;b(xj) Pr((xk;otm(xj))jxj)Pa
j=b a;b(xj)Pr((xk;otm(xj))jxj) : (3)
From these settings, a womans belief can be interpreted as history up to, but not includ-
ing, the search outcome in the period.17
All agents know (Fm; Fw). However, now, a woman has a belief about her own type.
Because we consider n types of agents, a woman believes she may belong to each of the fol-
lowing sets of types: [xn; x1] ; [xn 1; x1] ; : : : ; [x1; x1] ; [xn; x2]; [xn 1; x2]; : : : ; [x2; x2]; [xn; x3];
[xn 1; x3]; : : : ; [x3; x3]; : : : ; [xn; xn 1]; [xn 1; xn 1]; and [xn; xn]. Because the number of these
sets is n(1+n)2 , the number of beliefs,
l, is nite and becomes at most n(1+n)2 . Then, the
number of reservation utility levels of women in the market is at most n(1+n)2 .
Let xa;bj denotes the state of a woman whose type is xj and who has belief a;b. Let
Gi (:) denote the stationary distribution of agent i (= m;w)s states. Let us assume that any
xa;bj > 0 is a real number and belongs to [x¯ i
; xi] and that Gi (:) is strictly increasing over the
interval [x
¯ i
; xi]; i = m;w. (We dene Gi (:) more precisely later.) Let gw

xa;bj

denotes the
probability mass function of states.
Let us assume that all agents understand (Gm; Gw; 0) (at the steady state, Gm (:) and
Gw (:) depend on Fi (:) ; i = m;w). As all men know their types, Gm (:) = Fm (:).
Given (Gm; Gw; 0), any man uses a stationary strategy, where a strategy is a list of
women to whom he will propose when they meet. By contrast, any woman with imperfect
self-knowledge uses a stationary strategy in the sense that a strategy is a list of men to whom
she will propose when they meet in period t.
Let "m (xj) denotes the share of men who propose to a j-type woman, if they meet. Then,
let Fm (:jxj) denotes the type distribution of such men. Hence, w (xj) = "m (xj) is the rate
at which a j-type woman receives o¤ers. By contrast, let "w (xk) denotes the share of women
who propose to a k-type man, if they meet. Then, let Gw (:jxk) denotes the distribution of
the states of such women. Hence, m (xk) = "w (xk) is the rate at which a k-type man
receives o¤ers.
Let Vm (xk) denotes a k-type mans expected discounted lifetime utility when single.
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply that
Vm (xk) =
1
1+rdt

m (xk) dtE

max

xa;bj
r ; Vm (xk)

jxk

+ (1  m (xk) dt)Vm (xk)

where xa;bj has distribution Gw (:jxk). However, when a couple marries, each agent obtains
a utility ow equal to the spouses actual type, namely, xj . Manipulating this equation and
16Since we only consider pure strategies when self-knowledge is perfect in our model, Pr ((~xk; am (xk)) jxk) =
0 or 1 when a k-type woman observes (~xk; am (xk)), given the strategies of men.
17The set of types a woman believes she may belong to, [xb; xa]  [x¯w; xw]; for any a; b; can also be interpretedas an information set in a sequential-move game.
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letting dt! 0 yields
rVm (xk) = m (xk)E

max

xa;bj
r ; Vm (xk)

jxk

  Vm (xk)

: (4)
A k-type man will accept a woman on contact if and only if her type is at least as great as
Rm (xk)  rVm (xk).
By contrast, women with the same belief face the same decision problem, regardless of
their own type. Hence, the lifetime expected discounted utility of a woman with a;b in a
period dt, Vw
 
a;b

, satises
rVw
 
a;b

=
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)Vw
 
xj ja;b

= 11+rdt
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)
2664
(1  dt)Vw
 
a;b

+ (  w (xa)) dt
 
Vw
 
a;b

+(w (xa)  w (xj)) dt

Vw

d(k)+1;b

+w (xj) dtE

max
n
xk
r ; Vw

a;d(k)
o
3775 ;
where bj=aa;b (xj) = 1, and xk has Fm (:jxj). In the above equation, the second term
means that if a woman with a;b meets a man who rejects an a-type woman with probability
(  w (xa)), she does not change her belief, because she has already met another man with
x0 who has xa < Rm (x0)  xa 1 in the past.18 The third term means that if a j( a)-type
woman meets a k-type man who accepts a j 1-type woman but rejects a j-type woman, she
updates her belief to d(k)+1;b.
19 In the fourth term, if a woman with xa;bj rejects a k-type
man, who accepts her, she updates her belief to a;d(k): However, if xd(k)  xb, her belief
remains a;b in the next period.
Manipulating the above equation and letting dt! 0 yields
rVw
 
a;b

=
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)
24 (w (xa)  w (xj))Vw d(k)+1;b  Vw  a;b
+w (xj)

Emax
n
xk
r ; Vw

a;d(k)
o
  Vw
 
a;b

35 : (5)
A woman with a;b marries a man after contact if and only if his type is at least as great as
Rw
 
a;b
  rVw  a;b.
Equilibrium means that the reservation strategies Rm (:) are nondecreasing. If a woman
will propose to a man with type x0, she will also propose to a man with type x00 > x0. As
a result of receiving at least the same o¤ers, Vm (x00)  Vm (x0). Hence, Rm (x00)  Rm (x0).
From this, d (k) is not decreasing in k. By contrast, whether Rw(a;b) are decreasing or
increasing is not obvious, because a;b is a distribution, not a real number. However, as any
man who wants to marry a woman with x0 also wants to marry a woman with x00 > x0,
Vw
 
x00ja;b
  Vw  x0ja;b holds, for any a;b and x0; x00 2 [xb; xa].
Although whether Rw
 
a;b

are decreasing or increasing is not obvious, the order of
18Otherwise she cannot be a woman with a;b:
19From Gm (:) = Fm (:), w (xa)  w (xj) for xa > xj .
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the values of Rw
 
a;b

partitions men into classes. By using this, we can dene Gw (:)
more precisely. Let us order all women according to the type xj and values of Rw
 
a;b

.
When Rw
 
a;b
  Rw  a0;b0  : : :  Rw  a
¯
;b
¯

, we label the intervals as I1 = [xb; xa],
I2 = [xb0 ; xa0 ] ; : : :, Il = [xb¯
; xa
¯
].20 Then, l 2 (Il) for l = 1; 2; : : : ; l. Let xlk denotes a
k-type woman with l. Hence, we make the following assumption;
Assumption A.1. When Rw
 
a;b
  Rw  a0;b0  : : :  Rw  a
¯
;b
¯

, I1 = [xb; xa],
I2 = [xb0 ; xa0 ] ; : : :, Il = [xb¯
; xa
¯
]. We assume that x1a > x
1
a+1 > : : : > x
1
b
> x2a0 > x
2
a0+1 > : : : >
x2b0 > : : : > x
l
a
¯
> x
l
a
¯
+1 > : : : > x
l
b
¯
> 0 only for Gw (:) and gw (:).
From this assumption, the distribution Gw (:) is strictly increasing over the interval
[x
l
b
¯
; x1a]. Let 
l
j 2 [0; 1]; l = 1; 2; : : : ; l; denotes the share of women with l 2 (Il) of the
j-type women, where
Pl
l=1 
l
j = 1, for any j. From this, gw

xlj

= lj
w
j , for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n,
denotes the share of j-type women with l.
When Rw
 
a;b
  xk, given the best reservation match strategy, equation (5) can be
rewritten. Let x~s(j) denotes the highest type of men who accepts a j-type woman. Then, a
man with x  x~s(j) 1 rejects a j-type woman. From Vm (x00)  Vm (x0), for x00 > x0, s (j) is not
decreasing in j. Generally, the arrival rate of proposals to a woman with xj , for any j ( a),
becomes w (xj) = ~ni=s(j)
m
i , w (xa)   w (xj) = s(j) 1i=a mi , and Fm (:jxj) = F (:)n
i=s(j)
mi
.
Hence, if Rw
 
a;b
  xk, Rm (xk)  xd and d (k) < b, then the reservation match strategy of
a woman with a;b can be rewritten as
rVw
 
a;b

=
d(k)X
j=a
a;b (xj)
2666664
(w (xa)  w (xj))

Vw

d(i)+1;b

  Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ki=~s(j)
mi
~n
i=~s(j)
mi
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ni=k+1
mi
~n
i=~s(j)
mi

Vw

a;d(i)

  Vw
 
a;b

3777775
+
bX
j=d(k)+1
a;b (xj)
264 (w (xa)  w (xj))

Vw

d(i)+1;b

  Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ni=~s(j)
mi
n
i=~s(j)
mi

Vw

a;d(i)

  Vw
 
a;b

375 :(6)
where Vw

a;d(i)

= Vw
 
a;b

, for i such that xd(i)  xb.
If d (k)  b; a woman with a;b does not update her belief after meeting a k-type or lower
type man. At this time, by substituting d(i) = b, for i = k; : : : ; n into (5), we obtain
rVw
 
a;b

=
bX
j=a
a;b (xj)
264 (w (xa)  w (xj))

Vw

d(i)+1;b

  Vw
 
a;b

+w (xj)

ki=~s(j)
mi
~n
i=~s(j)
mi
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;b

375 : (7)
Equations (6) and (7) describe the reservation match strategies of a woman with a;b,
given the expected rate of proposals by men.
To simplify the analysis, we make the following assumption;
20 If Rw
 
a;b

= Rw
 
a0;b0

, let Il0 = [xb0 ; xa0 ] and Il0+1 =

xb00 ; xa00

.
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Assumption A.2. Men and women are partitioned into n classes by the reservation
levels of the opposite sex agents, in Sections 3.3-4.21
Assumption A.2. guarantees that typeequals classunder imperfect self-knowledge.
Therefore, the reservation level of a k-type man is a partition that determines the k-th type
of women. By contrast, let Rw
 
lk

= Rw

a00 ;b00

such that xk  Rw
 
a0;b0
  : : : 
Rw

a00 ;b00

> xk+1, for any k. That is, Rw
 
lk

is a partition that determines the k-th
type (or class) of men. Then, we can re write Rw
 
a0;b0

as Rw

lk 1+1

, for any k, where
l0 + 1 = 1. Because a woman with l, for l = lk 1 + 1; lk 1 + 2; : : : ; l; accepts a k-type man,
the equation (4) can be rewritten as
rVm (xk) = m (xk)
Rm(xk)X
j=1
Pl
l=lk 1+1 gw(x
l
j)
Gw(:jxk)
 xj
r   Vm (xk)

; (8)
where
Pl
l=lk 1+1 gw

xlj

is the share of j-type women who accept a k-type man.
Assumption A.2 also ensures that a man proposes to a woman of the same type because
there are n types of agents. Hence, xk+1 < Rm (xk) ; for k = 1; : : : ; n, d (k) = k and s (j) = j.
However, Assumption A.2 does not require that a woman proposes to a man of the same type
under imperfect self-knowledge.
In the next section, we investigate the characteristics of the reservation utility level of
agents with imperfect self-knowledge before we derive an equilibrium under imperfect self-
knowledge.
3.3 Analysis of the reservation utility level
The following lemmas hold for the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge.
The rst lemma shows that a woman with a;k rejects a k + 1-type man.
Lemma 1 Suppose that xk+1 < Ri (xk), for i = m;w and k = 1; : : : ; n. At this time,
Rw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1, for any a (1  a  k).
Proof. See Appendix.
The next lemma shows that the decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type
man depends on that of a woman with a;k.
Lemma 2 The decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type man, for any
k 2 fa+1; : : : ; bg, depends on whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

. If and only if Rw
 
a;b

> xk0,
then Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0. At this time, Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 holds. Moreover,
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b

= : : : = Rw
 
a;n

> xk0 ; (9)
21More generally, if men are partitioned into n0 types by the reservation levels of women, n0 kinds of
reservation levels of men are generated. Then, because of discrete types of agents, women are always partitioned
into n ( n0) types by the reservation levels of men.
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holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 implies that if a woman with a;b can update her belief to a;k0 (k
0 < b) after a
meeting, the decision of a woman with a;b depends on that of a woman with a;k0 . Hence,
given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 , the strategy of a woman with a;b becomes the same as that of a
woman with a;k0 .
Moreover, given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 , a woman with a;i rejects a i + 1-type man, for i =
a+ 1; : : : ; k0   1, and a woman with a;i, for i = k0; : : : ; n, rejects a k0-type man. Note that,
when k0 = b, a woman with a;b learns nothing from a meeting with a k0-type man.
The next lemma shows that the reservation level of a woman with a;b+1 is lower than or
equal to that of a woman with a;b for any b ( a) :
Lemma 3 Let us assume that Ri (xk) > xk+1; i = m;w. For any a (= 1; : : : ; n  l   1) ;and
l(= 0; : : : ; n  (a+ 1)),
R
 
a;a+l
  R  a;a+l+1 : (10)
Proof. See, Appendix.
Moreover, the next lemma also holds.
Lemma 4 A woman with a;b; for any a; b (a < b) ; has higher reservation level than that of
a woman with a+1;b; that is,
Rw
 
a;b

> Rw
 
a+1;b

:
Proof. See, Appendix.
Lemma 4 means that the reservation level of a woman with a;b is higher than or equal
to that of a woman with a+1;b.
From Lemmas 2 and 4, we obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 2 A woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise her reservation utility
level even if she receives an o¤er that has information about her type. Thus, Rw (0) is the
highest reservation level of women in equilibrium.
Proof. See, Appendix.
Proposition 2 means that if a woman with a;b rejects a k + 1-type man but accepts a
k-type man, a woman with a;i, i = k + 1; : : : ; n; also rejects a k + 1-type man but accepts
a k-type man. Then, a woman with a;i, i = k + 1; : : : ; n, cannot be a woman with a;k0 ; for
any k0  k. That is, a woman with a;i accepts a k-type man without having an opportunity
to revise her belief upward.
Moreover, even if a woman with imperfect self-knowledge can revise her belief upward,
she does not raise her reservation level. The decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept
a k+1-type man becomes the same as that of a woman with a;k+1. If a woman with a;k+1
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rejects a k+ 1-type man, a woman with a;b also rejects a k+ 1-type man and then updates
her belief to a;k+1; in other words, she previously rejects a man whom she will reject after
an upward belief revision. As a result, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise
her reservation level.22
Note that although Proposition 2 holds under Assumption A.2., Proposition 2 does not
require womens PSEI actions, which we dene in the next section. Moreover, results similar
to those in this section can be obtained in the case of a one-sided search model, where
xk+1 < Rm (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n, are given and where mens strategies are una¤ected by
womens strategies.
3.4 Search equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge
Next, we introduce an equilibrium concept for this section. Although a womans state changes
over time, we rst focus on the market in a stationary environment.
Denition 3 In a search equilibrium under (one-sided) imperfect self-knowledge (SEI):
Given (Gm; Gw; 0),
(SEI-i) all men maximize their expected discounted utilities,
(SEI-i) all womens strategies satisfy sequential rationality, and
(SEI-ii) womens beliefs along the equilibrium path are consistent with Bayesian updating
given the equilibrium strategies.23
By characterizing a search equilibrium for (Gm; Gw; 0), Section 4 identies (Gm; Gw; 0),
which implies that the two ow distributions are equal.
First, we derive a perfect sorting SEI (PSEI), where agents of the same type marry. The
PSEI requires that a woman with a;b, proposes to a-type men, and always rejects men of a
lower type. Otherwise, the PSEI does not occur because men and women of di¤erent types
marry.
Although one can consider many combinations of agentsequilibrium strategies, we focus
on the PSEI in this study because the inuence of learning on the market becomes clearer
when the PSE is compared with the PSEI. Moreover, from Proposition 2, Rw (0) is the
highest reservation level of women in an equilibrium. Hence, the opportunities for womens
learning are maximized in the PSEI.
Given the PSEI actions, a woman learns about her own type at most n  1 times. Here,
we use the terms ka;b-type womanand k-type womanas a woman with x
a;b
k and a woman
with xk and any , respectively.
The next proposition shows that there exists a unique PSEI, where agents partition
themselves into n clusters of marriages and where, therefore, only men and women of the
same type marry.
22Even in the case of a sequential move in which a man proposes to a woman in the rst move, and she
proposes or rejects him in the next move, the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does
not rise. In this case, a woman can learn before marriage; however, she @previously@still presently?@ rejects
a man whom she rejects@will reject?@ after revising her belief.
23This equilibrium concept is the same as that in Maruyama (2010).
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Proposition 3 We assume that xk+1 < Ri (xk), for k = 1; : : : ; n  1; and i = m;w. There
is a PSEI if, for k = 1; : : : ; n  1,
Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

= 
k;k+1(xk)
m
k (xk)+k;k+1(xk+1)
m
k (Rw(k+1;k+1))
(r+mk )
> xk+1; (11)
Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
= Ri (xk) > xk+1;
and if, for k = 1; : : : ; n  1,
Rm (xk) =

PRm(xk)
j=k
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
j)xj
r+
PRm(xk)
j=k
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
j)
> xk+1: (12)
In the PSEI, agents of the same type marry.
Proof of Proposition 3. We derive the desirable results by establishing the following lem-
mas.
First, we investigate the optimal strategies of women. We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If Rw
 
k;k+1

= 
k;k+1(xk)
m
k (xk)+k;k+1(xk+1)
m
k (Rw(k+1;k+1))
(r+mk )
> xk+1; a woman
with k;k+1 rejects a k + 1-type man, where xn+1 x¯ i; i = m;w. In the PSEI, Rw
 
k;k

>
Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

> xk+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n. Moreover, Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
=
Rw (xk) > xk+1 holds.
Proof of Lemma 5: First, let us investigate the decision of a woman with k;k, for k =
1; : : : ; n.
For k = 1, the arrival rate of proposals to a 1-type woman becomes w (x1) =  from
Fm (:jx1) = Fm (:). Then, rVw
 
1;1

= m1
 
x1
r   V
 
1;1

. Hence, Rw
 
1;1

=
m1 x1
r+m1
=
Rw (x1) > x2.
The arrival rate of proposals to a woman with xk, for k = 2; : : : n; becomes w (xk) =
Fm([xk 1; x1] ), which is the rate at which she meets men who accepts her. Given a random
contact, Fm (:jxk) = Fm(:)Fm([xk 1;x1] ) . From Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1, we have
rVw
 
k;k

= Fm([xk 1; x1] )
mk (
xk
r
 V (k;k))
Fm([xk 1;x1] )
:
Then,
Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
= Rw (xk) > xk+1: (13)
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Next, we investigate the decision of a woman with k;k+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n  1. From (6),
we have
rVw
 
k;k+1

= k;k+1 (xk)

mk
 
xk
r   Vw
 
k;k+1

+ mk+1
 
max
xk+1
r ; Vw
 
k;k+1
	  Vw  k;k+1
+k;k+1 (xk+1)

mk
 
Vw
 
k+1;k+1
  Vw  k;k+1+ mk+1  maxxk+1r ; Vw  k;k+1	  Vw  k;k+1 :
The rst term in the second square bracket in the above equation means that, if a woman
with k;k+1 is actually a k+1-type, she learns that she is the k+1-type by meeting a k-type
man. Thus,
Rw
 
k;k+1

= 
k;k+1(xk)
m
k (xk)+k;k+1(xk+1)
m
k (Rw(k+1;k+1))
(r+mk )
> ()xk+1: (14)
From (14), Rw
 
k;k+1

is uniquely obtained. In the PSEI, xk+1 < Rw
 
k;k+1

holds, for
k = 1; : : : ; n. Then, from Lemmas 2 and 3, Rw
 
k;k

> Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

>
xk+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n.
Lemma 5 shows that a woman with k;k+1 (k = 1; ::; n 1) rejects a k+1-type man if there
are su¢ cient k-type men or if k;k+1 (xk) is su¢ ciently large and satises xk+1 < Rw
 
k;k+1

.
If there are su¢ cient k + 1-type men, a woman with k+1;k+1 raises her reservation level.
Hence, a woman with k;k+1 also raises her reservation level because she may become a woman
with k+1;k+1 in the next period. Thus, more optimistic prior beliefs lead more women to
reject men who they would marry under perfect self-knowledge.
Women with imperfect self-knowledge assign probabilities to their own type. Therefore,
the reservation level of kk;b-type women (for k = 1; ::; b   1) are lowered in comparison
with the benchmark results. By contrast, the reservation level of ik;b-type women (for i =
k + 1; : : : ; b  1) are increased in comparison with the PSE.
Moreover, the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge increases as the
parameter  increases, because an increasing arrival rate of men speeds her learning process
and decreases the search duration.
When r = 0, Rw
 
k;k+1

= Rw (xk) (= xk) holds. Therefore, a woman with k;k+1
always prefers to meet a k-type man instead of accepting a k + 1-type man in order to
conrm her type. This is because, if a woman with k;k+1 is actually a k + 1-type, she will
marry a k + 1-type man sooner or later, regardless of her action. Hence, the possibility that
she is a k + 1-type woman does not a¤ect her own decision, because there is no time cost.
Consequently, the decision of a woman with k;k+1 is the same as that of a k-type woman
with perfect self-knowledge.
Next, we investigate the optimal strategies of men and marriage formation. Hence, we
obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6 A 1-type man rejects a 2-type woman because Rm (x1) = Rm (x1) > x2. If Rm (xk) =
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Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)xk
r+
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)
> xk+1, for k = 2; : : : ; n  1; a k-type man rejects a k + 1-type woman,
where xn+1 x¯ i; i = m;w. The reservation level of a k-type man in the PSEI decreases in
comparison with the benchmark result, that is, Rm (xk) > Rm (xk).
Proof of Lemma 6: From Lemma 5, xk  Rw
 
k;k

> Rw
 
k;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
k;n

> xk+1, for k = 1; : : : ; n, in the PSEI. Hence, Rw
 
lk

= Rw
 
k;n

and Rw

lk 1+1

=
Rw
 
k;k

, where Rw
 
lk

denotes a partition that determines the k-th type of men, for
k = 1; : : : ; n.
Since all women want to marry the most desirable men (i.e., x1) if they meet, m (x1) =
 and Gw (:jx1) = Gw (:). Hence, we have
Rm (x1) = 
Rm(x1)X
j=1
wj
 xj
r   Vm (x1)

= Rm (x1) :
A man with x1 accepts (rejects) a woman with x  (<)Rm (x1). From Rm (x1) > x2;
Rm (x1) > x2: Then, men with x1 and women with x1 form cluster 1.
Next, let us consider all men not in cluster 1. In the PSEI, l1 = [xn; x1]. From Assumption
A.1., the arrival rate of proposals to him becomes m (x2) = Gw([xl1n ; x
1
1]
 ) which is the
rate at which he meets women who accept him. The state distribution among such women
implies Gw (:jx2) = G (:) =Gw([xl1n ; x11] ). Therefore, the reservation level of a man with x2
becomes
Rm (x2) = Gw([x
l1
n ; x
1
1]
 )
Rm(x2)X
j=2
Pl
l=l1+1
gw(xlj)
Gw([x
l1
n ;x
1
1]
 )
 xj
r   Vm (x2)

= 
lX
l=l1+1
gw

xl2
  
x2
r   Vm (x2)

:
In the PSEI, x2  Rw
 
l1+1

= Rw
 
2;2

. A man with x2 proposes to any woman with
x  Rm (x2), so will all men not in cluster 1. In the PSEI, x2  Rm (x2) > x3. Then,
Rm (x2) =

Pl
l=l1+1
gw(xl2)x2
r+
Pl
l=l1+1
gw(xl2)
:
In the PSEI, intervals Il; for l = l1+1; : : : ; l, do not include x1. Moreover,
Pl
l=l1+1
l2
w
2 < 1,
from gw
 
xl2

= l2
w
2 . Thus, Rm (x2)  Rm (x2).
Some women with x2 reject men with x2, because these women have the same as or
higher reservation levels compared to Rw
 
l1

. Therefore, men with x2 and women with xl2,
for l = l1 + 1; : : : ; l; form cluster 2.
Similarly, we can consider a man in cluster 3; in a similar fashion, cluster n can be
constructed, where Rm (xn)  xn. Generally, from (8), the reservation level of a man with
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xk; for any k = 1; : : : ; n, becomes
Rm (xk) =

Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)xk
r+
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw(x
l
k)
:
where xk  Rw

lk 1+1

. Therefore, a k-type man wants to marry any women with x 
Rm (xk). In the PSEI, intervals Il; for l = lk 1 + 1; : : : ; l, do not include xk 1. Furthermore,Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw
 
xlk

< 1. From these, Rm (xk)  Rm (xk).
By contrast, a woman with xlk, for l = l(k 1)+1; : : : ; l, accepts a man with xk. Therefore,
men with xk and women with xlk, for l = l(k 1) + 1; : : : ; l, form cluster k. (More formally,
men with xk and women with x 2 [ll=l(k 1)+1[xlk; xl1] form cluster k. However, there are no
women with [xlk 1; x
l
1], for l = l(k 1) + 1; : : : ; l; in the PSEI).
Lemma 6 shows that with constant , if there are su¢ cient k-type women who accept a
k-type man (Rm (xk) > xk+1), a k-type man rejects a k + 1-type woman, for k = 1; : : : ; n.
However, rejections of k-type men by k-type women with imperfect self-knowledge lower his
reservation level, which as a result is lower than or equal to his under perfect self-knowledge.
The implications of Proposition 3 are as follows: If the economy is at the PSEI, then men
with xk and women with xlk, for lk 1 + 1; : : : ; l; form cluster k, for k = 1; : : : ; n. However,
Cluster 1 is not inuenced by women with imperfect self-knowledge.
The expected duration until marriage of each agent can be easily obtained. In the PSE, the
duration until the marriage of a k-type agent, i, is 1
jk
(i; j = m;w). In the PSEI, the duration
until the marriage of a k-type man is 1=
Pl
l=l(k 1)+1 gw
 
xlk

, for k = 2; : : : ; n. Therefore,
the marriages of all men, other than those in cluster 1, are delayed by the womens learning
process. For women, the expected duration di¤ers across l; for l = 1; ::; l. The duration
until the next period t of a woman with a;b is
1
b 1k=a
m
k
, for any a < b, and that of a woman
with k;k is
1
mk
, for k = 1; : : : ; n. Therefore, expected duration until marriage has its own
dynamics over time. Of course, womens marriages are delayed by their own learning, with
the exception of cluster 1. Hence, the welfare of each type of agent in the PSEI, other than
those in cluster 1, is lower than that in the PSE.
In a search equilibrium, it is not necessary that the outow of the market equals the
inow. In the next section, we investigate the steady-state equilibrium.
4 Steady state equilibria
Given (Gm; Gw; 0), from Proposition 3, it follows that a search equilibrium uniquely gen-
erates a partition (fRm (xk)gnk=1 ; fRw (l)g
l
l=1). This partition implies a unique type distri-
bution of exiting agents, Hi (:) ; i = m;w. This partition and N , the number of agents in
the market, also imply the number of agents who exit each state per period, dt. Thus, the
number of agents who exit the market per period is also obtained.
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To solve for the steady state equilibrium, we must describe how new singles enter the
market over time. In this study, we adopt the cloning assumption; if a pair marries and
leaves the market, two identical types of agents enter the market at once.24 Thus, the
distribution of types, Fi (:), i = m;w, is una¤ected by the strategies of agents under perfect
self-knowledge. Therefore, under the cloning assumption and perfect self-knowledge, given
(Fm; Fw; N) ; a search equilibrium implies a steady state equilibrium. The cloning assumption
is the simplest assumption in the inow specications (e.g., MacNamara and Collins (1990),
Morgan (1994), Burdett and Coles (2001), Bloch and Ryder (2000), and Chade (2006)).
However, in this papers model, any new female entrant does not know her own type. Hence,
the distribution of states, Gw (:) ; is changed by the strategies of agents under imperfect
self-knowledge.
The equilibrium concept for this section is as follows.
Denition 4 Given (Fm; Fw; N), a steady-state equilibrium under the cloning assumption is
(Gm; Gw; 0), where
(s-i) the agentsstrategies are consistent with a search equilibrium; and
(s-ii) for each state xlk, the inow and outow of agents are balanced.
25
The steady state requires (s-ii), regardless of the inow specications. As a result of (s-ii),
for each type k, the inow and outow of agents are also balanced. From (s-ii), (Fm; Fw) and
the optimal strategies of agents, given expectations about 0 (or 	w) and (Gm; Gw), together
indeed generate (Gm; Gw; 0) as the steady state distributions of states and the steady state
prior belief.
In the PSEI, all states of 1-type women are x1;bj , for b = 2; : : : ; n. However, there is no
woman with x1;11 because such a woman leaves the market and knows she belongs to the
1-type at the same time. Hence,
Pn
b=2 
1;b
1 = 1. From (s-ii), the following equation holds.
mb
nX
i=b+1
1;i1 
w
1N = 
b 1X
k=1
mk 
1;b
1 
w
1N; for b = 2; : : : ; n  1: (15)
The LHS of (15) implies that an b-type man changes the state of a woman with x1;i1 ; for
i = b+1; : : : ; n; to x1;b1 by proposing to her. Then, 
m
b dt is the probability in the small time
interval dt that a woman with x1;i1 meets a b-type man and thus learns something about her
type. It follows that the number of women who enter a state x1;b1 is 
m
b
Pn
k=b+1 
1;k
1

w1N .
By contrast,
Pb 1
k=1 
m
k on the RHS of (15) is the share of all men who change the state
of a woman with x1;b1 (i.e., they change her belief or lead her to exit the market). Then,

Pb 1
k=1 
m
k dt is the probability in dt that a woman with x
1;b
1 meets a man and then marries
or learns something about her type. Therefore, the number of women who exit a state x1;b1 is

Pb 1
k=1 
m
k 
1;b
1 
w
1N .
All sates of j (= 2; : : : ; n)-type women, xa;bj ; are as follows:
24Burdett and Coles (1999) describe four typical inowassumptions.
25This equilibrium concept is the same as that in Maruyama (2010).
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x1;jj x
1;j+1
j : : : x
1;n 1
j x
1;n
j
x2;jj x
2;j+1
j : : : x
2;n 1
j x
2;n
j
: : :
xa;jj x
a;j+1
j x
a;b
j x
a;n 1
j x
a;n
j
: : :
xj;jj x
j;j+1
j : : : x
j;n 1
j x
j;n
j :
Here,
Pj
a=1
Pn
b=j 
a;b
j = 1.
From (s-ii), if a < b, an a   1-type man changes the belief of a woman with i;b, for
i = 1; : : : ; a  1; to a;b by rejecting her. Moreover, a b-type man also changes the belief of a
woman with a;i, for i = b+1; : : : ; n; to a;b by proposing to her. It follows that the number
of women who enter a state xa;bj is 
m
a 1
Pa 1
i=1 
i;b
j

wj N + 
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 
a;i
j

wj N . By
contrast,
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k is the share of all men who change the state of a woman with x
a;b
j . It
follows that the number of women who exit a state xa;bj is 
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k 
a;b
j 
w
j N .
If a = b, a = b = j. At this time, a j 1-type man changes the belief of a woman with i;j ,
for i = 1; : : : ; j   1; to j;j by rejecting her. A woman with i;j for i = j + 1; : : : ; n; cannot
be a j;j by learning according to Proposition 2. Thus, the number of women who enter a
state xj;jj is 
m
j 1
Pj 1
k=1 
k;j
j

wj N . By contrast, 
m
j is the share of men who leads her to
exit the market. It follows that the number of women who exit a state xj;jj is 
m
j 
j;j
j 
w
j N .
From these, generally, for any j (= 1; : : : ; n), and any a; b(1  a  j  b  n), the
following equations hold.
ma 1
Pa 1
i=1 
i;b
j

+ mb
Pn
i=b+1 
a;i
j

=
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k

a;bj ; if a < b; (16)
mj 1
Pj 1
i=1 
i;j
j

= mj 
j;j
j ; if a = b (= j) : (17)
where if j = 1, a = j = 1 < b < n:
Given (Gm; Gw; 0), the next lemma holds for the relation between Gw and beliefs at the
steady state. Here, let ij = 	i (xj) 	i (xj 1), where nj=1ij = 1, i = m;w. Lemma 7 shows
that the beliefs calculated from Gw (:) are consistent with those calculated using Bayesrule.
Note that Lemma 7 always holds at the steady state regardless of the inow specication.
Lemma 7 Given (Gm; Gw; 0), for each state x
a;b
j , j 2 [a; b] ; a;bj is wj appropriately
rescaled. Moreover, the share of women with x0j of women with 0 in the market is equal
to the share of new female j-type entrants, that is,
gw(x0j)
nj=1gw(x0j)
= wj , for j = 1; : : : ; n. Hence,
the share of women with xa;bj of women with a;b in the market is equal to the probability
a;b (xj) which is calculated using Bayesrule, for any a; b (a < b).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 7 shows that the distribution of women with 0 in the market is consistent with
the prior belief of a woman and that the updated beliefs of women, l, are consistent with
Gw (:). Lemma 7 also implies that given Gw, which (Fm; Fw) and agentsstrategies generate,
means 0 is also given indirectly.
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The next proposition shows that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium, at which
men and women partition themselves into clusters.
Proposition 4 Given (Fm; Fw; N), (Gm; Gw; 0) is uniquely obtained. If (Gm; Gw; 0) sat-
ises (11) and (12), there exists a steady state PSEI.
Given (Gm; Gw), agentsstrategies and N imply the number of agents who exit the market
per period. Therefore, a unique type distribution of exiting agents is obtained. Under the
cloning assumption, this distribution also implies a type distribution of entrants, 	i; i = m;w.
Hence, 0 is obtained.
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we analyzed one-sided learning in a two-sided search model. Women were
assumed not to know their own type; they only learned about their own type from the o¤ers
or rejections they received from men. As a result of this learning process, the two-sided aspect
of the search problem has generated signicant interest. The main results of this study are
as follows. First, women with imperfect self-knowledge raise or lower their reservation level
in comparison with results under perfect self-knowledge. By contrast, reservation levels of
certain men are lowered if some women with imperfect self-knowledge reject those men who
they would accept under perfect self-knowledge.
Second, the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge is lowered by a
rejection but never raised by an o¤er. From this result, the reservation level of a woman with
a prior belief is the highest, and her reservation level gradually declines over the duration
of the search. In the labor market, the potential sources of declining reservation wages have
received much research attention.
Two extensions to this model present themselves. First, this study assumes that agents
cannot divorce. However, when women marry men before perfectly knowing their own type,
they may learn about their type after they get married; such learning after marriage will
inuence the divorce rate.
Second, for simplicity, we assume that agents types are discrete. The current results
would still apply if agentstypes were continuous and if n classes of marriages were generated
by a su¢ ciently large  under perfect self-knowledge. However, if types were continuous,
generally, the number of womens classes would be larger than that of mens classes, which
would make the analysis more complex. Hence, imperfect self-knowledge may generate further
changes.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we consider the decision of a 1-type woman. As she is
the highest type, all men propose to her. Hence, "m (x1) = 1 and Fm (:jx1) = Fm (:). From
(1), the expected discounted lifetime utility of an unmarried 1-type woman Vw (x1) ; becomes
rVw (x1) = 
m
1
 
x1
r   Vw (x1)

+
nX
j=2
mj
 
max
xj
r ; Vw (x1)
	  Vw (x1) :
If she meets a 1-type man with probability m1 , they always marry. If a 1-type woman
meets a 2-type man, she compares x2=r with Vw (x1). If she rejects a 2-type man, i.e.,
Vw (x1) >
x2
r , from (1),
rV rw (x1) = 
m
1
 
x1
r   V rw (x1)

:
By contrast, if she accepts a 2-type man and rejects a 3-type man (i.e., x2r  Vw (x1) >
x3
r ),
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rV aw (x1) = 
m
1
 
x1
r   V aw (x1)

+ m2
 
x2
r   V aw (x1)

:
If V rw (x1) > V
a
w (x1), a 1-type woman rejects a 2-type man. This inequality V
r
w (x1) >
V aw (x1) means that
x2 < R

w (x1)  
m
1 x1
m1 +r
< x1:
Conversely, if V rw (x1)  V aw (x1), a 1-type woman accepts a 2-type man. At this time,
x2  Rw (x1) holds.
As the situation is the same for a 1-type man, his reservation match strategy is Rm (x1) 
w1 x1
w1 +r
< x1:
Under x2 < Rw (x1) and x2 < Rm (x1), a 1-type woman proposes to and is accepted by
a 1-type man she encounters. Therefore, 1-type men and 1-type women form a cluster of
marriages (cluster 1).27
If x2 < Rw (x1) and x2 < Rm (x1), we can construct cluster 2. Let us consider all
agents not in cluster 1. Now, a 2-type agent is the highest-type agent. Therefore, the
arrival rate of proposals to a 2-type woman is w (x2) = Fm
 
(x1)
  = Pnj=2 mj , which
is the rate at which she meets men not in cluster 1. The type distribution among such men
implies Fm (:jx2) = Fm (:) =Fm
 
(x1)
 . Therefore, a 2-type womans discounted lifetime
26 If x3=r < Vw (x1)  x2=r, 1- and 2-type agents receive at least the same number of o¤ers. Hence,
Vw (x1)  Vw (x2), and we then have Vw (x2)  x2=r.
27 If agents types are continuous, all women with type xk  Rm (xm) face the same problem because all
men propose to them. Then, they use the same strategy as the highest type women, i.e., Rw (xk) = Rw (xw)
for all xk  Rm (xm). This situation is the same for men in that Rm (xk) = Rm (xm) for all xk  Rw (xw).
As a result, men with xk  Rw (xw) and women with xk  Rm (xm) form class 1.
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utility becomes
rVw (x2) = Fm
 
(x1)
  m2
Fm((x1) )
 
x2
r   Vw (x2)

+
Fm((x1) )
Fm((x1) )
nX
j=3
mj
 
max
xj
r ; Vw (x2)
	  Vw (x2)
= m2
 
x2
r   Vw (x2)

+ 
nX
j=3
mj
 
max
xj
r ; Vw (x2)
	  Vw (x2) :
Consequently, the reservation match strategy of a 2-type woman is
x3 < ()Rw (x2)  
m
2 x2
m2 +r
:
Similarly, the reservation match strategy of a 2-type man is x3 < ()Rm (x2)  
w
2 x2
w2 +r
:
Under Rw (x2) > x3 and Rm (x2) > x3, 2-type men and 2-type women form cluster 2.
Note that although agents in cluster 2 also want to marry agents in cluster 1, they are always
rejected by them.
If Rw (x2) > x3 and Rm (x2) > x3, we can construct a third cluster of marriages (cluster
3) in a similar fashion and so on until for some n, Rw (xn)  
m
n xn
mn +r
x
¯
and Rm (xn) 
wnxn
wn+r
x
¯
.28 Then, n-type men and n-type women form a cluster (cluster n).
Proof of Lemma 1: We prove this lemma by mathematical induction. Let V xkw denotes
the expected discounted utility of a woman who accepts a k-type man. However, V xkw may
not be optimal.
First, we prove that when a = k   1, rV xkw
 
k 1;k

> Rw
 
k;k

holds. The decision of a
woman with k;k whether to accept a k + 1-type man becomes
rVw
 
k;k

= k
xk
r
  Vw
 
k;k

+ k+1

max
nxk+1
r
; Vw
 
k;k
o  Vw  k;k :
Thus, the decision of a woman with k;k depends on whether
xk+1
r exceeds Vw
 
k;k

. From
xk+1 < R

i (xk), Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1:
By contrast, let us consider the decision of a woman with k 1;k whether to accept a k+1-
type man. From w (xj) = ~ni=j
m
i , w (xk 1)   w (xj) = j 1i=k 1mi , and Fm (:jxj) =
F (:)
ni=j
m
i
, for j = k  1; k; the decision of a woman with k 1;k whether to accept a k+ 1-type
man becomes
rV
 
k 1;k

= kj=k 1k 1;k (xj)
"
j 1i=k 1
m
i
 
Rw
 
i+1;k
  Vw  k 1;k+ki=jmi  xir   Vw  k 1;k
+mk+1
 
max
xk+1
r ; Vw
 
k 1;k
	  Vw  k 1;k
#
:
Thus, the decision of a woman with k 1;k depends on whether
xk+1
r exceeds Vw
 
k 1;k

.
28An n-type woman always accepts an n-type man. Otherwise, she cannot marry. Similarly an n-type man
always accepts an n-type woman.
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Noting that Rw
 
k;k

=
mk xk
r+mk
,
rVw
 
k 1;k
  rVwk;k
= rV xkw
 
k 1;k
 Rw  k;k
= 
k 1;k(xk 1)ki=k 1
m
i (xi)+k 1;k(xk)[mk 1(Rw(k;k))+
m
k (xk)]
(r+mk 1+
m
k )
 Rw
 
k;k

=  (k 1;k(xk 1))
m
k 1(Rw(k;k) xk 1)
r+mk 1+
m
k
:
From xk+1 < Ri (xk), Rw
 
k;k
  xk 1. Hence, rV xkw  k 1;k > Rw  k;k. That
is, given Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1, a woman with k 1;k always rejects a k + 1-type man. The
optimal strategy of a woman with k 1;k always satises Rw
 
k 1;k
  rV xkw  k 1;k. Hence,
Rw
 
k 1;k

> Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1 in an equilibrium.
Let us assume that rV xkw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

, for a = k 1; k 2; ::; l, and l (2  l  1  k).
That is,
V xkw
 
a;k
  Vw  k;k
= 
Pk
j=a a;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(~{+1;k))+
k 1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]+
m
k (
xk
r )
(r+ki=a
m
i )
  Rw(k;k)r
=
r
Pk
j=a ka;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(~{+1;k))+
k 1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
+
rmk (
xk
r ) Rw(k;k)(r+ki=ami )
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
;
Here, noting that 
m
k xk
r+mk
= Rw
 
k;k

and
Pk
j=a a;k (xj) = 1,
V xkw
 
a;k
  Vw  k;k
=
r
Pk
j=a a;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(~{+1;k))+
k 1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
  Rw(k;k)
k 1
i=a 
m
i
r(r+ki=a
m
i )
= 
Pk
j=a a;k(xj)[
j 1
i=a
m
i (rVw(~{+1;k) Rw(k;k))+k 1i=j mi (xi Rw(k;k))]
(r+ki=a
m
i )r
> 0;
holds. From this, Rw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

also holds. Given these, let us investigate the
case of a = l   1. At this time,
rV xkw
 
l 1;k
 R  k;k
= 
Pk
j=l 1 l 1;k(xj)[
j 1
i=l 1
m
i (rVw(~{+1;k) Rw(k;k))+k 1i=j mi (xi Rw(k;k))]
(r+ki=l 1
m
i )r
:
From Rw
 
k;k
  xk, k 1i=j mi  xi  Rw  k;k > 0. Moreover, from Rw  a;k > Rw  k;k,
for a = k   1; k   2; : : : l, (2  l  1  k), we have V xkw
 
l 1;k

> V
 
k;k

: Therefore,
Rw
 
l 1;k

> Rw
 
k;k

> xk+1.
From these results, rV xkw
 
a;k

> Rw
 
k;k

, for any a (1  a < k) :
Proof of Lemma 2: Let V xkw denotes the expected discounted utility of a woman who
accepts a k-type man, for any k 2 (a; b].29. However, V xkw may not be optimal.
From w (xj) = ~ni=j
m
i , w (xa)   w (xj) = j 1i=ami , and Fm (:jxj) = F (:)ni=jmi , the
29A woman with a;b, for a  b; always accepts an a-type man.
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decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type man, for any k 2 (a; b], becomes
rVw
 
a;b

= 
kX
j=a
a;b (xj)
266664
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b
  Vw  a;b
+k 1i=j 
m
i
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;b

+mk
 
max

xk
r ; V
xk 1
w
 
a;k
	  Vw  a;b
+b 1i=k+1
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
  Vw  a;b
377775
+
bX
j=k+1
a;b (xj)
"
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b
  Vw  a;b
+b 1i=j 
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
  Vw  a;b
#
: (18)
From (18), if she accepts a k-type man,
V xkw
 
a;b

=
0@ Pkj=a a;b (xj) hj 1i=ami  Vw  i+1;b+ki=jmi  xir +b 1i=k+1mi  Vw  a;ii
+
Pb
j=k+1 a;b (xj)
h
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b

+b 1i=j 
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
i
1A
r + b 1i=a
m
i
:
If she rejects him,
V
xk 1
w
 
a;b

=
0BB@ 
Pk
j=a a;b (xj)
h
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b

+k 1i=j 
m
i
 
xi
r

+b 1i=k
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
i
+
Pb
j=k+1 a;b (xj)
h
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;b

+b 1i=j 
m
i
 
Vw
 
a;i
i
1CCA
r+b 1i=a
m
i
:
Hence,
V xkw
 
a;b
  V xk 1w  a;b = Pkj=a a;b(xj)mk hxkr  V xk 1w (a;k)i(r+b 1i=ami ) :
From this,
V xkw
 
a;b

< ()V xk 1w
 
a;b
, xk < () rV xk 1w  a;k = Rw  a;b :
That is, the decision of a woman with a;b whether to accept a k-type man depends on
whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

. From this, given xk0 < Rw
 
a;b

, equilibrium requires that
rV
xk 1
w
 
a;k
  xk, for k = a+1; : : : ; k0 1, and xk < rV xk 1w  a;k, for k = k0; : : : ; n, holds.
Next, given xk0 < Rw
 
a;b

, let us investigate the best strategy of a woman with a;k0
because V xk 1w
 
a;k

may not be optimal. Her decision whether to accept a k0   1-type man
becomes
rVw
 
a;k0

= 
k0X
j=a
a;k0 (xj)
2664
j 1i=a
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;k0
  Vw  a;k0
+k
0 2
i=j 
m
i
 
xi
r   Vw
 
a;k0

+mk0 1

max
n
xk0 1
r ; V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1
o  Vw  a;k0
3775 :
Therefore, her decision depends on whether
xk0 1
r exceeds V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1

. Because xk 
rV
xk 1
w
 
a;k

, for k = a + 1; : : : ; k0   1, holds, xk0 1  rV xk0 2w
 
a;k0 1

. Hence, the best
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strategy of a woman with a;k0 is Rw
 
a;k0

= rV
xk0 1
w
 
a;k0

> xk0 . Then, we have
Rw
 
a;b

= Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 :
Next, let us investigate the decision of a woman with a;k0+1, for k
0 + 1  b. Similar
to a woman with a;k0 , the decision of a woman with a;k0+1 whether to accept a k
0-type
man also depends on whether xk0r exceeds V
xk0 1
w
 
a;k0

. Given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 ,
xk
r <
V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

; k = k0; : : : ; b; holds. Therefore, she reject a k0-type man at least. Moreover,
the decision of a woman with a;k0+1 whether to accept a k
0   1-type man also depends
on whether
xk0 1
r exceeds V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1

. Given Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 ,
xk
r  V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

, for
k = a; : : : ; k0   1; holds. Hence, xk0 1r  V
xk0 2
w
 
a;k0 1

. From these results, Rw
 
a;k0+1

=
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 .
By repeating the same procedure until the decision of a woman with a;b 1, we obtain
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b 1

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 :
If Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 , a woman with a;b+l, for any l > 0; also rejects a k
0-type man. This is
because her decision depends on whether xk0r exceeds V
xk0 1
w
 
a;k0

. Hence,
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b

= : : : = Rw
 
a;n

> xk0 :
Conversely, given Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 , xk  rV xk 1w
 
a;k

, for k = a + 1; : : : ; k0   1. From
this, a woman with a;b also rejects a k
0-type man. Moreover, a woman with a;b rejects a
k0+1-type or lower type man from the reservation property. Hence, if Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 , then
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk0 for any b  k0. In other words, given Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0 , we have
Rw
 
a;k0

= Rw
 
a;k0+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;n

> xk0 :

Proof of Lemma 3: We prove the lemma by mathematical induction. First, we inves-
tigate the case where l = 0;for any a = 1; : : : ; n 1. From Ri (xk) > xk+1, a woman with a;a
always rejects an a + 1-type man, i.e., Rw
 
a;a

= 
m
a xa
ma +r
> xa+1. If a woman with a;a+1
also rejects an a+ 1-type man, her value becomes
rV xaw
 
a;a+1

= r
a;a+1(xa)
m
a (
xa
r )+(1 a;a+1(xa))ma (Vw(a+1;a+1))
r+ma
. From these
Rw
 
a;a
  rV xaw  a;a+1 = ma  1  a;a+1 (xa) xa rVw(a+1;a+1)r+ma
From rVw
 
a+1;a+1
  xa+1 < xa, Rw  a;a > rV xaw  a;a+1 :
From Lemma 1, a woman with a;a+1 always rejects an a + 2-type man. Moreover, she
always accepts an a-type man. From these, we have
Rw
 
a;a
  Rw  a;a+1 : (19)
Next, we investigate the case of l = 1 for any a = 1; : : : ; n  2. To simplify the notation,
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pj = a;a+1 (xj) and qj = a;a+2 (xj) : If a woman with a;a+2 rejects an a+ 1-type man, her
decision depends on whether xa+1r exceeds V
xa
w
 
a;a+1

. At this time,
V xaw
 
a;a+1

= V xaw
 
a;a+2

: (20)
If a woman with a;a+1 rejects an a+ 2-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+1

=

Pa+1
j=a pj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+1))+
a+1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
:
Similarly, when a woman with a;a+2 rejects an a+ 2-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+2

=

Pa+1
j=a qj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+2))+
a+1
i=j 
m
i (
xi
r )]+qa+2[
a+1
i=a 
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+2))]
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
.
Moreover, from (3), pj =
qj
qa+qa+1
, for j = a; a+ 1. Therefore,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+1
  V xa+1w  a;a+2
= 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
2664
qa
qa+qa+1
Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  qaVw  xaja;a+2
+ qa+1qa+qa+1Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
  qa+qa+1qa+qa+1 (1  (qa + qa+1))Vw
 
xa+2ja;a+2

3775
= 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
26666664
qaVw(xaja;a+1)
qa+qa+1
  qaVw
 
xaja;a+2

  qa(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xa+2ja;a+2)qa+qa+1
+
qa+1Vw(xa+1ja;a+1)
qa+qa+1
  qa+1Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+2

  qa+1(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xa+2ja;a+2)qa+qa+1
37777775
Here, from Vw
 
x00ja;b
  Vw  x0ja;b ; for any a; b (a < b) ; and x00 > x0,
V
xa+1
w
 
a;a+1
  V xa+1w  a;a+2
 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
2666664
qa
qa+qa+1
Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  qaVw  xaja;a+2
  qa(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xaja;a+2)qa+qa+1
+ qa+1qa+qa+1Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
  qa+1(1 (qa+qa+1))Vw(xaja;a+2)qa+qa+1
3777775
= 
(r+a+1i=a 
m
i )
"
qa
qa+qa+1
 
Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  Vw  xaja;a+2
+ qa+1qa+qa+1
 
Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
#
Here, Vw
 
xaja;a+1
  Vw  xaja;a+2 = a+1i=ami  xir   a+1i=ami  xir  = 0. Moreover,
Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+2
= ma Vw
 
a+1;a+1

+ ma+1
xa+1
r  

ma Vw
 
a+1;a+2

+ ma+1
xa+1
r

= ma

Vw
 
a+1;a+1
  Vw  a+1;a+2
From (19), for any a, Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+1
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+2. From these, we have
V xa+1w
 
a;a+1
  V xa+1w  a;a+2 : (21)
From (20)-(21), in an equilibrium,
Rw
 
a;a+1
  Rw  a;a+2 ; (22)
must hold. Specically, if a woman with a;a+2 rejects an a + 3-type man, Rw
 
a;a+1

>
xa+2  R
 
a;a+2

.
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Let assume that Rw
 
i;a+l 1

> Rw
 
i;a+l

, for l = l   1 and a = 1; : : : ; n   l, and for
i = a; a+ 1; : : : ; a+ l   1.
Given this, let us investigate the case of l = l. If a woman with a;a+l rejects an s-type
man, for s = a + 1; : : : ; a + l   1, her decision depends on whether xsr exceeds V
xs 1
w
 
a;s

.
Similarly, if a woman with a;a+l+1 rejects an s-type man, for s = a + 1; : : : ; a + l   1, her
decision also depends on whether xsr exceeds V
xs 1
w
 
a;s

. Therefore, for s = a+1; : : : ; a+l 1,
V xsw
 
a;a+l

= V xsw
 
a;a+l+1

: (23)
If a woman with a;a+l rejects an a+ l-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l

=

Pa+l
j=a pj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+l))+
a+l
i=j
m
i (
xi
r )]
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
:
Similarly, when a woman with a;a+l+1 rejects an a+ l-type man, her value becomes,
V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l+1

=

Pa+l
j=a qj[
j 1
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+l+1))+
a+l
i=j
m
i (
xi
r )]+qa+l+1[
a+l
i=a
m
i (Vw(i+1;a+l+1))]
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
.
Moreover, from (3), pj =
qj
(qa+:::+qa+l)
, for j = a; a+ 1; : : : ; a+ l. Therefore,
V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l
  V xa+lw  a;a+l+1
= 
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
26666666666664
qa
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  qaVw  xaja;a+l+1
  qa(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+l+1ja;a+l+1

+ qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l)Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
  qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+l+1ja;a+l+1

+ : : : :
+
qa+l
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  qa+lVw  xa+lja;a+l+1
  qa+l(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+l+1ja;a+l+1

37777777777775
 
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
26666666666664
qa
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  qaVw  xaja;a+l+1
  qa(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xaja;a+l+1

+ qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l)Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  qa+1Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
  qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l+1

+ : : : :
+
qa+l
(qa+:::+qa+l)
Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  qa+lVw  xa+lja;a+l+1
  qa+l(qa+:::+qa+l) (1  (qa + : : :+ qa+l))Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l+1

37777777777775
= 
(r+a+li=a
m
i )
266664
qa
(qa+:::+qa+l)

Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  Vw  xaja;a+l+1
+ qa+1(qa+:::+qa+l)

Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
+ : : :
+
pa+l
(qa+:::+qa+l)

Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  Vw  xa+lja;a+l+1
377775
Here, Vw
 
xaja;a+l
  Vw  xaja;a+l+1 = a+li=ami  xir   a+li=ami  xir  = 0.
Vw
 
xa+1ja;a+l
  Vw  xa+1ja;a+l+1
=
h
ma
 
Vw
 
a+1;a+l

+a+li=a+1
m
i
 
xi
r
i  hma  Vw  a+1;a+l+1+a+li=a+1mi  xir i
= ma
 
Vw
 
a+1;a+l
  Vw  a+1;a+l+1 :
...
Vw
 
xa+lja;a+l
  Vw  xa+lja;a+l+1
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=
h
a+l 1i=a 
m
i
 
Vw
 
i+1;a+l

+ ma+l
 
xi
r
i  ha+l 1i=a mi  Vw  i+1;a+l+1+ ma+l  xir i
= a+l 1i=a 
m
i
  
Vw
 
i+1;k
   Vw  i+1;k+1
= ma
 
Vw
 
a+1;a+l
  Vw  a+1;a+l+1
+ma+1
 
Vw
 
a+2;a+l
   Vw  a+2;a+l+1
+ : : :
+mk 1
 
Vw
 
a+l;a+l
  Vw  a+l;a+l+1 :
From the assumption of mathematical induction, Vw
 
i;a+l
   Vw  i;a+l+1 > 0,for i =
a+ 1; : : : ; a+ l; holds. Therefore, V xa+lw
 
a;a+l

> V
xa+l
w
 
a;a+l+1

. From this and (23)
Rw
 
a;a+l+1
  Rw  a;a+l :

Proof of Lemma 4: From Lemma 2, the decision of a woman with a;b, for any
a; b (a < b), whether to accept a k-type man depends on whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a;k

,
for k 2 (a+ 1; b). Similarly, the decision of a woman with a+1;k whether to accept a k-type
man depends on whether xkr exceeds V
xk 1
w
 
a+1;k

, for k 2 (a+ 1; b). Here,
V
xk 1
w
 
a;k
  V xk 1w  a+1;k
= 
(r+k 1i=a 
m
i )
0BBBBBBB@
pa
m
a
 
xa
r

+ (1  pa)ma Vw
 
a+1;k

+

a+1j=apj

ma+1
 xa+1
r

+

1  a+1j=apj

ma+1Vw
 
a+2;k

+

a+2j=apj

ma+2
 xa+2
r

+

1 

a+2j=apj

ma+2Vw
 
a+3;k

+ : : :
+(1  pk)mk 1
 xk 1
r

+ pk
m
k 1Vw
 
k;k

1CCCCCCCA
  
(r+k 1i=a 
m
i )
0BBBBBBBB@
ma Vw
 
a+1;k

+

pa+1
1 pa

ma+1
 xa+1
r

+

1 

pa+1
1 pa

ma+1Vw
 
a+2;k

+

a+2j=a+1
pj
1 pa

ma+2
 xa+2
r

+

1 

a+2j=a+1
pj
1 pa

ma+2Vw
 
a+3;k

+ : : :
+

1  pk(1 pa)

mk 1
 xk 1
r

+ pk(1 pa)
m
k 1Vw
 
k;k

1CCCCCCCCA
= 
(r+k 1i=a 
m
i )
0BBBBBBBB@
ma pa
xa rVw(a+1;k)
r
+ma+1pa (1  (pa + pa+1))
xa+1 rVw(a+2;k)
r(1 pa)
+ma+2pa (1  (pa + pa+1 + pa+2))
xa+2 rVw(a+3;k)
r(1 pa)
+ : : :
+mk 1papk
xk 1 rVw(k;k)
r(1 pa)
1CCCCCCCCA
:
From xi  Rw
 
i;k

, for i = a + 1; : : : ; k, xi 1 > rVw
 
i;k

. Hence, V xk 1w
 
a;k

>
V
xk 1
w
 
a+1;k

, for any k (< a+ 1).
Given xk < Rw
 
a+1;b

, for k 2 (a+ 1; b), xk < Rw
 
a+1;k

= Rw
 
a+1;b

, from Lemma
2. From V xk 1w
 
a;k

> V
xk 1
w
 
a+1;k

= Rw
 
a+1;k

> xk,
xk < Rw
 
a+1;k

= Rw
 
a+1;b

< rV
xk 1
w
 
a;k
  Rw  a;k. However, when xk <
Rw
 
a;k

, Rw
 
a;k

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk from Lemma 2. Therefore, for any k 2 (a+ 1; b),
xk < Rw
 
a+1;b

= Rw
 
a+1;k

< Rw
 
a;k

= Rw
 
a;b

:
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Proof of Proposition 2: Given Rw (0) > xk+1; there are no women with 1;i, for
i = 1; : : : ; k, in the market.30 Furthermore, from Lemma 2
xk  Rw
 
1;k+1

= Rw
 
1;k+2

= : : : = Rw
 
1;n 1

= Rw (0) > xk+1 (24)
holds. From this, even if a woman with 0 updates her belief to 1;i; for any i 2 fk+1; ::; n 1g,
after a meeting, then her reservation level does not rise.
A woman with 1;i, for i = k + 1; : : : ; n; becomes a woman with a;i if she is rejected by
an a  1-type man, for any a > 1. From Lemma 4, Rw
 
1;i

> Rw
 
a;i

.
For any a; b(1 < a  k < b); given Rw
 
a;b

> xk+1;
xk  Rw
 
a;k+1

= : : : = Rw
 
a;b 1

= Rw
 
a;b

> xk+1
holds from Lemma 2. Therefore, if a woman with a;b updates her belief to a;i; for any
i 2 fk+1; ::; b  1g, then her reservation level does not rise. Furthermore, a woman with a;b
cannot be a woman with a;i, for any i 2 fa; : : : ; kg, who has a higher reservation level than
that of a woman with a;b. This is because a woman with a;b always accepts a k-type man.
By contrast, a woman with a;b becomes a woman with a0;b if she is rejected by an
a0   1-type man, for any a0 > a. From Lemma 4, Rw
 
a;b

> Rw
 
a0;b

. Hence, she revises
her reservation level downward.
From these results, a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not raise her reservation
level in search.
Finally, we show that Rw (0) is the highest reservation level of women in equilibrium.
Given Rw (0) > xk+1; (24) holds. Let us assume that there is a woman with a;k0 , who
has her reservation level such that Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0  xk, for any a; k0 (1 < a < k0  k).
A woman with 1;i, for i = k + 1; : : : ; n; becomes a woman with a;i if she is rejected by
an a   1-type man. Similarly, a woman with a0;i, for a0 (1 < a0 < a), and i = k + 1; : : : ; n;
becomes a woman with a;i if she is rejected by an a   1-type man. Here, a woman with
a;i; i = k + 1; : : : ; n; becomes a woman with a;k0 if she rejects a k
0-type man who proposes
to her. However, Rw
 
1;i

> Rw
 
a;i

. Then, xk  Rw
 
a;i

, for i = k+1; : : : ; n, from (24).
This contradicts the fact that there is a woman with a;k0 who has Rw
 
a;k0

> xk0  xk.
Thus, there are no such women in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7: Given 	w (:), 0 consists of 0 (xj) = wj , for j = 1; : : : ; n. Accord-
ing to Bayesrule, a belief a;b (xj), for any a; b; j (1  a  j  b  n), becomes a;b (xj) =
j
bj=aj
.
By contrast, let us derive beliefs a;b (xj) from Gw (:) and then, conrm these beliefs are
consistent with those calculated by using Bayesrule. For this, let us investigate the balanced
ow in all states. Let 0j = 
1;n
j . All states of a woman with x
a;b
j for any j are as follows.
30 If there was a woman with 1;i, for i  k, she would reject an i-type man in her past. In this case, a
woman with 0 must reject an i-type man from Lemma 2.
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x1;jj x
1;j+1
j : : : x
1;n 1
j x
1;n
j
x2;jj x
2;j+1
j : : : x
2;n 1
j x
2;n
j
: : :
xa;jj x
a;j+1
j x
a;b
j x
a;n 1
j x
a;n
j
: : :
xj;jj x
j;j+1
j : : : x
j;n 1
j x
j;n
j :
Given wj and , for the state x
1;n
j = x
0
j , the balanced ow is satised if and only if
wj = 
n 1X
k=1
mk 
0
j
w
j N: (25)
where wj  is the inow of new female entrants with xj .
31 From (25), 0j = 
w
j =
Pn 1
k=1 
m
k 
w
j N:
Then, let us investigate the balanced ow in the state xa;bj , for any j = 1; : : : ; n.
For a = 1 and b = n  1, (i.e., x1;n 1j ); from (16),
1;n 1j =
mn 1Pn 2
k=1 
m
k
01 = A1;n 1
0
j ;
where A1;n 1 = mn 1=
Pn 2
k=1 
m
k is the coe¢ cient of 
0
j . Then, for a = 1 and b = n   2, we
have
1;n 2j =
mn 2(
1;n 1
1 +
1;n
1 )Pn 3
k=1 
m
k
=
mn 2(A1;n 1+1)Pn 3
k=1 
m
k
0j = A1;n 2
0
j
where A1;n 2 = mn 2 (A1;n 1 + 1) =
Pn 3
k=1 
m
k

. We can recursively repeat the same proce-
dure until b = j: Therefore, for a = 1; and b = j; : : : ; n; we have
1;bj =
mb

1;b+1j +
1;b+2
j +:::+
1;n
j

Pb 1
k=1 
m
k
=
mb (A1;b+1+A1;b+2+:::+A1;n 2+A1;n)Pb 1
k=1 
m
k
01 = A1;b
0
j : (26a)
where A1;n = 1. However, if j = 1, all states of a woman with x1 are x
1;2
1 ; : : : ; x
1;n
1 ; because
there are no women with 1;1 in equilibrium. Hence, a = j = 1 < b:
Similarly, for a = 2, b = j; : : : ; n, and a < j  b or a = j = 2 < b, we have
2;bj =
m1 
1;b
j +
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 
2;i
jPb 1
k=2 
m
k
=
m1 A1;b+
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 A2;iPb 1
k=2 
m
k
0j = A2;b
0
j :
If a = b = j = 2,
2;22 =
m1 
1;2
2
m2
=
m1 A1;2
0
2
m2
;
from (17) and (26a).
The same procedure is repeatedly applied until a = j. Therefore, generally, for a < j  b
31Under the cloning assumption, wj and  are endogenous, whereas they are exogenous under the exogenous
inow assumption.
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or a = j < b; (j = 1; : : : ; n); we can rewrite a;bj as
a;bj =
ma 1

1;bj +
2;b
j +:::+
a 1;b
j

+mb

a;b+1j +
a;b+2
j :::+
a;n
j

(
Pb 1
k=a 
m
k )
=
ma 1
Pa 1
i=1 Ai;b+
m
b
Pn
i=b+1 Aa;iPb 1
k=a 
m
k
0j = Aa;b
0
j : (27)
For a = j = b, (j = 2; : : : ; n), from (17), we have j;jj =
mj 1(
1;j
j +
2;j
j +:::+
j 1;j
j )
mj
: From
(27), a;jj = Aa;j
0
j , for a = 1; : : : ; j   1. Hence,
j;jj =
mj 1
Pj 1
i=1 Ai;j
mj
0j = Aj;j
0
j : (28)
From (25), (27) can be rewritten as
a;bj = Aa;b
wj

Pn 1
k=1 
m
k 
w
j N
; (29)
Hence, from (25) and (29), noting that Aa;b depends only on Fm (:), we have
0 (xj) =
gw(x0j)
nk=1gw(x
0
j)
=
0j
w
j
nj=1
0
j
w
j
=
wj
nj=1
w
j
= wj ;
and
a;b (xj) =
gw

xa;bj

bj=agw

xa;bj
 = a;bj wj
nj=1
a;b
j 
w
j
=
Aa;b
0
j
w
jPb
j=a Aa;b
0
j
w
j
=
wjPb
j=a 
w
j
:
These equal to 0 (xk) and a;b (xj), which are calculated by using Bayesrule. Hence,
beliefs a;b (xj) are consistent with distribution Gw (:) in the steady state equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: Now, Gm = Fm holds.
First, let us consider the case of j = 1. In the PSEI,
Pn
b=2 
1;b
1 = 1. Let 
1;n
1 = 
0
1 =
1  Pn 1b=2 1;b1 . Therefore, the number of unknown variables, 1;b1 , for b = 2; : : : :; n   1; is
n  2. By contrast, from (15), the number of equations is n  2, which becomes equal to the
number of unknown variables, 1;b1 :
Next, let us consider the case of j = 2; : : : ; n: From
Pj
a=1
Pn
b=j 
a;b
j = 1, let 
1;n
j =
0j = 1  
Pn 1
b=j 
1;b
j  
Pj
a=2
Pn
b=j 
a;b
j . Hence, the number of unknown variables, 
a;j
j , is
j (n  (j   1))  1. By contrast, from (16)-(17), the number of equations is j (n  (j   1)) 
1 because a woman cannot become x0j = x
1;n
j from the other states. Therefore, the number
of equations becomes equal to the number of unknown variables.
From these results and Lemma 7, for any j = 1; : : : ; n; the system has a unique solution,
(Gw; 0).
From these results, given any (Fm; Fw; N), (Gm; Gw; 0) is always uniquely obtained. If
(Gm; Gw; 0) satises (11) and (12), there exists a steady state PSEI.
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